

DYNAMICS OF THE TANKSHIP INDUSTRY

by

ALFRED I. RAFF

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science
in Shipping and Shipbuilding Management
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

June, 1960

Signature of Author

Department of Naval Architecture and
Marine Engineering, May 21, 1960

Certified by

Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by

Chairman, Departmental Committee on Theses

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful and friendly guidance given by Professor Jay W. Forrester, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author is also thankful to Professor Forrester for the original stimulus to pursue the subject of industrial dynamics.

The author further acknowledges the assistance shown by Professor S. Curtis Powell, Department of Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the following men in the industry: Mr. Edward Woods, Orion Shipping and Trading Company, Messrs. F. J. Joyce and A. Stanley, National Bulk Carriers, Inc., Messrs. Weber and Samson, Charles R. Weber Company, and Mr. A. J. Kelly, Jr., Standard Oil Company (N. J.).

This work was done in part at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computation Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the IBM 704, and their cooperation is appreciated.




TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Introduction	7
II. The Tankship Industry	4
III. Description of the Model	17
A. Supply Department	20
B. Chartering Department	26
C. Operating Department	32
D. Independent Owners	35
E. Tankship Brokers	40
F. Coordination Department	45
G. Shipyard Sector	55
IV. Results and Analysis	63
V. Conclusions	73
VI. Recommendations for Further Work	75
Bibliography and References	76
Appendix	78
A. Least Square Straight Line Curve Fit	79
B. Differential Equation Prediction Technique	80
C. Equations of the Model, First Revision	83
D. Glossary of Variables and Parameters	96

I. INTRODUCTION

The world tankship industry has long been known to go through severe cyclical fluctuations. In general terms, we see short periods of extreme tanker scarcity and excessively high freight rates, followed by longer periods of large tanker idleness and marginally low freight rates. The whole cycle usually lasts from four to five years. In the depression period, when there is marked overcapacity in the industry, there is, of course, little incentive for tanker owners to increase their fleet size. However, in the boom, when there are not enough tankers to satisfy the demand, orders are placed for new construction at a high rate even though delivery time on these vessels may stretch three to four years into the future. Thus, the cycles seem to be self-perpetuating and inherent in the industry structure.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the qualitative behavior of the tankship industry, especially the cyclical phenomenon. The study will include a review of the major factors that control behavior and their influence on the total system.

The method of analysis to be employed is industrial dynamics. As a general description, one could say that "industrial dynamics is an analysis of the information-feedback characteristics of our industrial enterprises to show how the tendencies toward instability, the competitive relationships, and the forces of growth are affected by structure, policy (a source of amplification), and delays (in decisions and actions)."
(2) Industrial dynamics starts with a knowledge of "descriptive management" and attempts to formalize what is known about the many parts of a company, industry, or economy. It is then possible to study the interactions of these parts with the entire system (which is the sum of all

the parts). See references (3) and (4) for a more extensive discussion of the background and philosophy of industrial dynamics.

Once a background of information on the basic organizational structure, functional relationships, and management decisions is acquired, the next step is to express this knowledge in a precise manner; that is, to formulate a mathematical model that describes what you know about the system you are dealing with. The mathematical model should, as closely as possible, follow the descriptive knowledge without going into excessive detail where it does not seem to be warranted. The model will usually be quite non-linear, since the systems dealt with in the real world are hardly linear. "The closed-loop, information-feedback characteristics and the decision-making procedures are incorporated." "The formulation can deal with an unstable system if the world it represents is unstable. It can incorporate hundreds or even thousands of variables to achieve sufficient reality to be useful. The computation needed for solution is only proportional to the number of variables and lies well within the capability of today's computers." (4)

As implied above, once the model is constructed, it is solved for a specified length of time on a digital computer. It is usually started in a condition of (equilibrium) steady-state, and then disturbed. The system will then be excited and respond according to its inherent structure and composition. By making changes in the model and then having it again solved, or run, on the computer, we can study the effect of any parameter decision, or organizational change on system performance (response).

The Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has developed an IBM 704 Program for generating dynamic models. By following specified procedures and

formats, one need have no knowledge of digital computer programming in order to have their model run on the IBM 704. See references (5), (6), and (7) for full information on preparing one's problem for computer solution.

With all of the foregoing in mind, this thesis thus presents first information on the organization and policies of the tankship's industry, including an analysis of some past history. This is not only the basis for construction of the model, but also serves as a comparison to the computer results to insure that they are reasonable or to indicate the direction for improvement. Then the model is formulated, step by step, showing the derivation of and assumptions implicit in, each equation. Results of computer runs are next presented with analysis of their significance to the main theme of investigation: what are the major determinants of cyclical behavior? Great care must be exercised in drawing conclusions from the results of computer runs. We are, in fact, only looking at a mathematical model and not the real world. Depending on how much faith we have in the model's similarity with the actual system, we can expand computer results to explanations of real world events.

Furthermore, we must realize that we are not looking for quantitative answers or predictions. We are trying to find quantitative behavioral patterns. We are looking for forces that control such overall qualitative actions.

II. THE TANKSHIP INDUSTRY

Fundamentally, the tankship industry derives its existence from the oil industry. It performs the function of transporting certain quantities of oil (either crude or refined products) between certain points. The necessity for this function is based simply upon man's demand for the use of oil and the fact that major oil-producing areas (Persian Gulf, Venezuela, U. S. A., etc.) are not necessarily coincident with major oil-consuming areas (U. S. A., Western Europe, etc.). It is obvious that the general growth of the industry is threatened from two sides: 1. the discovery of new sources of oil closer to consuming areas than present supply sources (such as discoveries in the Sahara by French interests and others), and 2. the advent of different means of transporting oil more economically than by oil tanker (such as oil pipeline, inflatable barges, or perhaps, air transports). It is fortunate, however, for the industry that the above-mentioned threats to the tanker industry's growth are factors that are frequently hampered by political pressures and are very slow to reach significant proportions. For a short general discussion of the present status, and historical development of the tanker industry, see reference (10).

Before going into a discussion of factors that determine system behavior, we must commence with the description of the broad industry structure and functioning. The demand for tankship services obviously comes from the ~~oil~~ companies which must supply their customers with ~~refined~~ refined products, or which must supply their refineries with crude oil. The supply of tankers is found in two quarters. The larger oil companies themselves have marine subsidiaries that operate vessels to partially meet their needs (about 35% of the world fleet). The

remainder of the world's tankers are owned by independent companies whose profit comes from renting or chartering their vessels to the oil companies. The charter agreement can take on many forms, but two types of charters predominate. There is the ~~time~~ charter where the owners rent their vessels out for a certain length of time (from several months to as much as ten years), and receive payment as a monthly rental. There is also the voyage charter wherein the vessel is rented for only one voyage (or perhaps several) between specified ports, and the payment is on a per-ton-cargo-transported basis. See reference (8) for the exact nature of typical charter arrangements.

Usually, most of the independent owners' tankers will be on time, or a long-term charter. Thus, the oil companies actually have a substantial part of their tonnage requirements heavily committed; that is, either owned or on a long-term hire. It is in the voyage charter market (spot market) where the excess, so to speak, demand is met and quick changes in plans can be accommodated. This demand, together with a given, rather inflexible short-run supply schedule determines the existing voyage charter freight rate (dollars per ton).

The supply and demand sides are brought together by the tankship broker. The brokers take a certain request for tonnage from the oil companies and seek an owner who can accommodate the specific requirements. A charter agreement is then signed which fairly well delineates the responsibilities and rights of both parties involved. On the date specified by the charter agreement, the vessel will commence operations and continue as long as is agreed upon.

Both the independent owners and oil company marine divisions order, as they so decide, new tankers from the shipyards of the world. The shipyards build only on order; they do not keep any stock or inventory

on hand. Orders may be cancelled, with the penalty depending on how much work had been done on the contract, and the details of the arrangements made. Of course, as new vessels are delivered, older ships which are no longer economical to operate (this depends on the freight rate available to them) are scrapped; that is, sold as scrap iron.

Though the basic organizational framework of the industry is not overly complicated, the decisions which drive it onward are often motivated through nebulous means. Perhaps the most important motivation, in many of the important decisions, is that of freight rates or market expectations. What will be the condition of the market so many months, or years from now? This expectation is a major determinant in the decisions to order new ships, as well as to scrap existing vessels. For example, if a high freight rate is foreseen, independent owners will order new tankers and avoid scrapping as much as possible, to have many ships taking advantage of the high rates. Oil company marine divisions will also order new vessels and put off scrapping both to avoid having to pay such high rates and also to meet their heavy demand. In this respect, the large oil companies, of course, do not especially like high freight rates, but neither do they favor very low rates. Even though the cost of transportation is but a small fraction of the final price of oil, such low rates encourage the small oil companies, or "outsiders", who depend primarily on chartered tonnage, to attempt price cutting. If they do not cut their prices, their profits are greatly inflated since they can take advantage of the low freight rates to a greater degree than the larger oil companies. In a market boom period, however, the smaller companies which do not have much of their requirements filled by long-term charters, are severely hard-pressed indeed. Thus, the large oil companies must be careful in their policies for

fleet expansion or they may create a market condition they find distasteful.

Expectations also exert an influence on chartering. The oil companies attempt to keep a balance between voyage and time charters that they deem favorable. If a scarcity of tankers is foreseen in the near future, they may try to cover more of their demands with time charters. There may thus, be many different expectations looking into the future by varying amounts of time.

Other motivations, besides market expectations, also have some significance. Financial considerations are a part of every decision. Large tankers represent heavy capital goods investment (as high as \$25 million per vessel). Financing such purchases pose problems for both the independent owner and the oil company marine divisions. Obviously, before charters are signed, both parties consider seriously the financial aspects of the arrangement and possible alternatives.

Some of the very typical considerations of most industries, however, are not found in the tanker industry. Product quality, or in this case, service quality, is extremely uniform. Differences between vessels in speed or flexibility are reflected closely in the freight rates. Marketing, or sales effort, is on a very informal basis directed at either brokers or oil companies. As in any industry, certain trade connections are made which prove lasting, but in general, the market is highly competitive, with the lowest bid getting the charter. There is no organized market, however, but only the brokers who may, in an effort to secure specific tonnage, contact other brokers and thus create a sort of limited marketplace. Advertising is unheard of in the industry. Research and development activity is on an absolute minimal scale. Technological progress is stimulated predominantly in

military areas. The recent tremendous increase in the size of tankers (the largest tanker afloat today has a capacity of about 100,000 long tons of oil, over six times as great as that of the largest World War II tanker) is not so much a technological advance, as an operational advance. The technical knowledge to build such large ships is not new, but the realization of their economic advantage is.

Perhaps allied to the financial motivation, but in a sense quite different, is the idea of speculation. Should an independent owner put all of his vessels into long-term charters that pay reasonable returns and thereby gain security, or should he "play" the voyage market, taking the ups with the downs, hoping that soon another boom will prove him right? All the independents, and there are many small firms involved (the largest independent owns 37% of the world fleet), have their own opinions. None follows one extreme or the other. There are some heavily committed to the spot market. Others are reluctant to order a new vessel without first having secured at least a five-year charter in advance.

It becomes clear, after some exposure to the industry, that policies and decisions are not only based on predictions of the future, but must be designed around such predictions. Major decisions have far reaching effects into the future. Predictions which are supposed to influence decisions are not only in themselves extremely rough, but further altered by the very decision it has led to. Individual owners or oil companies cannot plan the industry's future, but only hope to meet their own objectives. What may be the best policy for an individual owner or oil company, may not be best for the industry as a whole when it is followed extensively. Decision-makers find it hard to remember that the pattern of the industry has always been cyclical when

they are in the midst of another boom. In the depression periods, the next boom is never in sight.


For a more detailed description of the important considerations in the industry, see references (1) and (13).

It would be well at this point to look at some of the recent industry history. Not only should this prove enlightening in itself towards an understanding of the industry, but should also serve as a yardstick against which to measure model behavior. At the very least, the model should resemble the industry behavior in general terms. Figure I is a plot showing voyage freight rate between 1951 and 1958. Freight rates are quoted customarily as percentages over or under scale. The industry has adopted, as a convention, what are known as "Scale No. 2 Rates". The scale rates specify a freight rate, in shillings per ton (London market), for many trade routes. When established in 1954, they were supposed to represent fair prices based on average costs and profits. Whether they still have such significance is a moot point, since they are predominantly used merely as a convenient measure of freight rates, not only between different points in time, but also between different routes. Figure I then, shows an estimated voyage rate over various routes for a common size of vessel (these rates are for cargos of crude oil, referred to as "dirty", as opposed to refined products, "clean"). It can be clearly seen that the industry went through a complete cycle from 1951 to about 1956. The cycle is not a smooth one (sinusoidal), but rather quite flat in the depression periods with sharply defined periods of extremely high freight rates. It is obvious that the industry does not move gradually from boom to depression periods. Within a few months, which is short compared to the four- or five-year cycle period, the market can go from an extremely

Estimated Tanker Market Rates - Single Voyages (Dirty)

Based on fixtures 9/18000 tons in various directions

400% over Scale



Source: Conrad Boe Ltd. A/S, Shipbrokers, Oslo, Norway

Figure I

high rate to a very low rate (see 1957). It should also be noted that the boom periods have occurred at times when the demand may be considered to have been especially heavy. The Korean War (1950 to 1952) and the closing of the Suez Canal (late 1956 to 1957) certainly imposed excessive strains on the tankship industry. However, these strains should not be overly exaggerated. The oil companies have been able, in such situations, to effectively rearrange their supply and route structure to meet the situation. Certainly such exigencies tighten the market, but it is not so certain that they completely cause cyclical behavior. For example, the last boom started at the end of 1955, well before the Suez crisis. The cyclical behavior seems to be inherent in the industry structure, with temporary crises acting as the trigger to accentuate the pattern.

In Figure II we see what lies behind the freight rates. The solid line shows the tonnage available over the period from 1950 to 1959. It is measured in "T-2 Equivalents" which is used to express the sum of the many different tankers on a common basis. The T-2 is a ship design developed prior to World War II. During the war over 500 of these ships were built and they have become a common reference point. They have a speed of 14.6 knots and a deadweight capacity of 16,600 long tons (deadweight tons - dwt) is a measure of the total variable weights on a ship and include, in addition to cargo, fuel, stores, and crew and effects). (A T-2 can carry about 15,200 tons of cargo oil.) Thus, a vessel of different speed and deadweight can be expressed as so many T-2 equivalents, i.e., a tanker with a speed of 16.6 knots and 29,200 dwt, would equal $(16.6/14.6) \times (29,200/16,600) = 2.0$ T-2 equivalents.

While the solid line shows available tonnage, the small circles

show the average annual tonnage utilization and the dashed line shows the approximate pattern of tonnage utilization over the time period covered. It can be noted that those periods where available tonnage exceeds that utilized, which means that the difference represents idle tankers, correspond to periods of depressed freight rates. Idle tankers, however, do not always indicate the complete market condition. Vessel slow-down (which also saves fuel costs), increased time for ship repairs and overhauls, and inefficient ballast voyage arrangements can add further to the effective surplus amount of tonnage. Just as well, in times of need, the opposite of such measures adds considerably to the effective tonnage in operation.

It may also be noted that when oil companies can plan requirements closely, that is, when a surplus exists which allows a certain flexibility, the utilization pattern follows a seasonal pattern. In the fall and winter months, oil demand (from consumers) is highest and consequently requires greater-than-average tanker shipments. When at all possible, the oil companies will attempt to gauge their tanker usage closely, so as to reduce storage and other costs to a minimum.


The basic trend of tonnage utilization as shown in Figure II is intimately related to the increased world demand for oil and the location of supply points relative to consumption areas. Oil consumption has been increasing over the years. This, in turn, has influenced supply patterns, for the increased amounts of oil have had to come from more distant points. Since 1950, oil demand has increased an average of about 6.5 per cent per year while tankship utilization has increased an average of about 9.5 per cent per year. As far as the tanker industry is concerned, however, it is not felt that oil demand or supply orientation are substantially affected in the long run by tankship

market developments. Such areas are considered beyond the scope of this endeavor.

Figure III presents some statistics of the shipbuilding industry which, of course, is closely related to the tankship industry. Figure IIIa shows the rate of new tanker deliveries from 1949 to 1959. Aside from the short-term fluctuations there appears to be a cyclical pattern. This is due, naturally, to the rate of new tanker orders received, which, as shown in Figure IIIb, is severely peaked at two points of time. The high order inflow builds up the new construction backlog, Figure IIIc, which stimulates increased production effort which, in turn, leads to a high delivery rate. The delay involved, however, is considerable, about two to three years, and acts to aggravate the tanker market. For example, the large amount of orders placed in 1956 and 1957 will undoubtedly produce record delivery rates in 1959 and 1960, which come at a time when the market is already depressed and there is a huge surplus of tonnage. This burst of orders came at a time when the market was extremely high, but how justified was the belief that such a condition would last much longer? The backlog in 1957 was about equal to the total fleet. Such a condition should have been ample warning of the impending market reversal.

In reviewing the organization and decision structure, and the past history, of the tankship industry, it becomes clear that it is an extremely difficult task to formulate such knowledge into analytical statements that are really significant and plausible. The attempt at such formulation that follows is not to be considered the final answer at all, but more like the first preliminary trial. It is expected that many areas of the model will need overhaul. Modifications, additions, and major revisions are only natural in the development of a model such

Figure III



Source: Reference (9) & (11)

as this. The next chapter will explain the formulation of the model as originally conceived, and any revisions that time permitted this writer to undertake.



III. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL

The original model was formulated with the intent of only providing a basic foundation upon which further work might build. It was early decided that flows of both manpower and materials were not major factors in the industry and could, therefore, be omitted from the model, since we shall attempt to include only the most important determinants of behavior. Financial considerations also, have been omitted though at times they are significant. It was felt that in looking at the entire industry, the aggregate of all the individual firms, financial considerations were not of first-order magnitude. The system, therefore, consists of only flows of capital goods, orders, and information.

Other factors that have some bearing on the industry but which for the present work have not been included, are technological changes, changes in ship size, and governmental restrictions. These should be included in a more complete model but were not felt to warrant initial consideration. It was not felt that these factors exert major forces on the inherent industry behavior in the long run. Later inclusion of these factors might prove highly interesting.

One point should be borne in mind in going through the development of the model. That is, any part of the formulation that is not thought to be reliable can be tested. By formulating that part in what is thought to be a more reasonable form, and then looking at the new computer results, we can determine not only the importance to over-all system behavior of this part, but also the relative difference between the two formulations.

Figure IV is a flow diagram for the over-all system. It shows

the seven sectors of the model and the main flow of information, orders, and capital goods (tankships) among them. Information flows are the dashed lines, orders are the lines with small circles, and capital goods are the heavy solid lines. Rates of flow are indicated by small valve symbols. In general, the model attempts to follow actual behavior, even where such may be simplified, for greater clarity and coherence.


The external input to the model, shown on the upper left of Figure IV, is the short-run demand for oil. This demand goes to the supply departments of the oil companies which must see that the many refineries and consumers are adequately supplied. The supply department, therefore, translates this demand for oil into a demand for the transportation of oil. In addition, it also establishes predictions as to the future demand for oil. The chartering department of the oil company marine divisions receives the demand for tankships and decides upon a rate of voyage chartering to meet this short-run demand (CRV). The operating department of the oil company marine divisions is set up to keep account of, and transfer as required, the oil company's own tanker fleet. It, therefore, receives new vessel deliveries from the shipyards (TDO) and discards vessels for scrap (RSO). The independent owners sector not only keeps account of the independently owned fleet, but also generates the major decisions of that segment of the industry. Orders for new construction are sent to the shipyards (TOI) and vessels are received (TDI), as well as scrapped (RSI).

The tankship brokers sector receives the orders for both voyage charters (CRV) and time charters (CRT). When these charters are to go into effect, the appropriate rate of vessel transfer is instituted. The brokers also determine the voyage freight rate and its apparent rate

TCAS = 18 months

CPMS = 0.80, CPNS = 1.00

The equations of the complete model (including a later revision) can be found in Appendix C. They are arranged according to the sectors presented here, and are written in the format required by DYNAMO IIA as specified in reference (5). They are, however, quite similar to their presentation in this chapter. To the left of each equation is its equation form number, and to the right are this author's equation serial numbers. Included in this tabulation are all the parameters required and the initial conditions used. The initial conditions represent a steady state condition where all levels and rates remain constant. Actual industry history seems to indicate a general continual growth of the industry, with a steady state never reached even in terms of steady growth. Though this initial condition is therefore not realistic, it serves as a convenient starting point from which to observe model response. After some time, the system should display its inherent characteristics regardless of initial conditions.



IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Before looking at some computer runs of the model, it is well to keep in mind some of the assumptions made, and omissions, in the model as formulated. Results must be looked at in the light of these before one can think of translating such results to real world conditions, for after all, the results are applicable to the real world only insofar as we trust the model is a representation of the real world.

After going through the model formulation it is obvious that much of it is a simplification, in varying degrees, of the real world considerations. Most of the decisions in reality are based on cost and profit analyses. These analyses are in turn based on expectations of the market to a considerable extent. The model, however, does not consider, for example, vessel operating costs versus expected revenue to decide on whether to scrap the vessel or not. Most of the model decision rules treat expectations directly, not through cost and revenue analyses. It is hoped that the decision rules, as formulated, include the major factors at work that lie at the true basis for making these decisions.

Costs are not considered in two other areas. In the decisions to order new vessels, no account is taken of the construction price charged by the shipyards. While this may have some actual effect on ordering, it is not felt to be of major proportions. That is, once it is decided that a new vessel is desired, it will be ordered regardless of cost. Since most vessels are ordered during good market conditions, a higher vessel cost will be easily accommodated. Also, in the voyage freight rate determination, it is assumed that the oil companies do not consider such costs, but merely charter vessels as their demand

dictates regardless of freight rate. Certainly, at high freight rates the oil companies will take every effort to increase the efficiency of their own fleet so that their chartering is at a minimum rate.

The model does not include the time charter freight rate. This rate depends very closely on vessel operating costs and to a lesser degree on market conditions. It was not felt that inclusion of this rate would materially affect the system behavior, for this rate is system determined, not system determining.

There are many assumptions implicit in the formulation of the various parts of the model. These assumptions, however, are causing model behavior and we should gain some insight into them through analysis of model behavior. The first three computer runs with the original model used the following inputs: 1. 10% step in demand for oil, 2. ramp function, of 6% of initial conditions increase per year, in demand for oil, and 3, noise, randomly distributed, sampled once per month, within plus or minus 5% of initial conditions, in demand for oil (see Dynamo Run Nos. 883, 884, and 885. Copies of all runs are on file with the Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge).

The initial reaction of the system, in the first run, with the 10% step increase, is an obvious shortage of vessels. The freight rate almost immediately rises to its maximum limit and stays there for about 30 months, at which time enough new vessels have entered the industry so that the freight rate falls, and does so sharply. Once the freight rate drops, all tanker orders are cancelled by the oil companies but it is too late. The great number of vessels under construction, ordered during the high rate, keep coming out of the shipyards causing more and more surplus tonnage. Scrappage rates, which at first dropped

off, rise with the depressed market conditions. The general behavior of the system is quite in keeping with what would be expected. Since there is no noise in the model, things change smoothly for the most part, with freight rates being the notable exception.

It is interesting to note here the difference between the least square straight line and smoothing process extrapolation methods. After the 10% step, both predictions rise at about the same rate reaching the 10% increase after about 22 months. The prediction based on the smoothing process peaks at about a 12% increase after about 47 months, and then decreases approaching the 10% point asymptotically. The least square prediction peaks at about a 14% increase after about 40 months, then decreases and at 60 months, and thereafter, gives an accurate prediction, since the demand is constant. It seems that the two extrapolation methods, in this case, give approximately equivalent results.

The major conclusion from this run was noted in the tanker ordering rates, comparing the oil companies with the independents. The usual practice has been that the independents are quick to place orders when the market improves, while the oil companies are slower to react, but do react. When the market drops, the independents are quick to cancel orders, while the oil companies have a firmer basis for their orders. This run, however, shows the oil companies ordering heavily at first, while the independents order very little more than previously. When the market collapses, the oil companies quickly cancel all they can, while the independents merely reduce their ordering rate. Because of this, the independent owners ordering decision will be revised before making any further computer runs. However, the other two runs mentioned were made with the original model (as reruns on the first run using the same computer code generation).

The second run, with the ramp input, showed the same basic character as the first run, except that the high freight rate lasted longer, about 60 months. This is understandable since the demand kept increasing with time and rose by 30% in the 60 months. Also, the market starting^{ed} turning up again about 40 months later as increased demand kept reducing the surplus of the depressed period. Thus, we see cyclical behavior in the model that is quite reasonable. Here too, however, the same comments apply regarding the new vessel ordering rates.

The third run, with noise, exhibits unusual characteristics. The freight rate swings back and forth between maximum and minimum values with complete randomness over relatively short periods of time. Obviously, the system has elements that are much too closely attuned to short run changes than should be the case. In addition, the noise is actually amplified to some extent by the fluctuations it causes in average length of haul. This type of noise pattern is not actually the case. Demand moves around what may be regarded as the trend with yearly cycles, and any additional noise to this seasonality is not great at all, say about plus or minus 1%. Unfortunately, time did not permit any further runs with noise input, so that this question is not really completely settled. However, it can be noticed from Figure I that there seems also to be some seasonality in the freight rate, that is, peak values tend to occur during the winter months with lower rates during the summer months. This seems to indicate that the market is, in fact, sensitive to short run demand shifts, but not as sensitive as the third computer run would indicate.

It may be also observed that in all three runs the construction price rose to about twice its normal value during the favorable market conditions, which greatly increased the shipyards' backlog. It may,

The foregoing decision rule formulation definitely allows for cancellations and is quite flexible, in that policy considerations can greatly affect it. The parameters required for this modification to the model are:

TLTI = 36 months

MNDI = 1.5 months

PLDI = 0.40

NIFI = 0.96

This value of PLDI means that at a maximum predicted freight rate, the independents ordering goal will be to take over 40% of the oil companies share of the market. These equations replace equations (69), (75), (79), and (90) of the original model. The initial conditions for these equations are the same as for the previous decision rule.

Having thusly revised the original model, two more runs were made (see Dynamo Run Nos. 1001 and 1002). The first run had a 10% step disturbance, while the second had the same ramp disturbance that was used previously. Both of these runs showed ~~one~~ dominant feature, that is, the new tanker ordering by the independents was extremely high, unrealistically so. The independents backlog grew to as high as four times the total fleet of existing tankers. After an extensive and lengthy investigation two reasons for this unusual occurrence were found. Unfortunately, time did not permit its correction, and the subsequent computer runs.

The first reason lies in equation (68) which relates predicted freight rate to the ratio of desired to actual share of the market. This equation was formulated to show the increase of the independents' goals of market strength as the predicted freight rate increased. The desired curve of this relationship started at a ratio of zero for the


minimum freight rate, 0.5, rose to a ratio of one at the normal freight rate, 1.0, and then rises gradually to a ratio equal to MIS (Maximum desired Increase in Share of market) at the maximum freight rate, 3.5. After closer scrutiny of the equation as formulated, it is found to go through the three points specified, but in addition has a peak value of about twice what its maximum value should have been at a predicted freight rate of about 2.3. This caused the ordering rate to be abnormally high when the predicted freight rate was between 1.0 and 3.5. This phenomenon can be noticed by observing the peaks in the ordering curve as the predicted freight rate passes through this region.

However, even when the predicted freight rate was at a value of 3.5, indicating a favorable market attitude, and avoiding the formerly described error, the ordering was excessively high. This is especially noticeable in the second boom period of the computer results. The reason can be found in equation (189), which estimates the delivery time on new tankers orders. The estimate is quite simply the total backlog divided by the present delivery rate. This estimate is good if there are no sharp changes in the rate at which orders are placed. What happened in this case, however, was that after the extended depression period a sudden burst of orders started coming in. The current delivery rate does not react very quickly to this. Therefore, there was a very high backlog compared to delivery rate, the estimated delivery time was very, very long, and so the amount of new vessels that would be delivered (PNI) was far below what it should have been. This caused the high ordering rate to persist.

It is hoped that others may benefit by this description of the difficulties in the revised decision rule. It is indeed unfortunate that time prevented their correction, especially since most other

aspects of system behavior were found to be quite reasonable. It is further hoped that further work with this model may improve it in other ways, of which this author is sure there are many.

In general, however, it was felt that the model behavior was good, in that it showed responses that were logical and reasonable. Thus, it seems that many of the assumptions and omissions made are, in fact, not prime determinants of industry behavior. The rate at which orders are placed for new vessels is, on the other hand, a highly important determinant of the cyclical behavior. The ultimate refinement of these decision rules could lead to results which would be very illustrative of the forces behind the cyclic pattern.




V. CONCLUSIONS

A dynamic model of the tankship industry has been formulated. Its behavior is in general reasonable, compared to actual behavior patterns, but certain parts of it need additional revision. Time prevented this author from proceeding in that direction.

The model contains seven sectors and is built around a functional design of the industry. The supply department, oil companies, receives the demand for oil and generates the demand for tankers, as well as predictions of oil demand. The chartering department, oil company marine divisions, generates the voyage chartering rate based on short run demands and predictions. The operating department, oil company marine divisions, keeps track of the vessels and transfers them as required. The independent owners sector, includes all their functions, new tanker ordering, scrapping, and transfer of their fleet. The tankship brokers handle signed but unstarted charters, establish the prevailing freight rate, and generate predictions of the freight rate. The coordination department, oil company marine divisions, generates the long term policy decisions of new tanker ordering, scrapping, and time chartering rate. The shipyard sector transforms the orders for new vessels into subsequent tanker deliveries. All of these sectors are related to each other through information flows. Major consideration has been given to the role that expectations and predictions of the future play in the decision-making processes. Major assumptions made in formulation of the model include average length of haul is constant over long run, oil companies employ their own vessels if at all possible, short-run unsatisfied demand is made up when vessels are available, demand is met regardless of freight rate if vessels are available, and the static short-run supply

curves is fixed over time. Some of the major considerations that are not included in the model are financial or funds flow influences, technological and size changes in ships, governmental restrictions, time charter freight rates, the cost of new construction, and the role of operating costs and revenues in decision analysis.

In spite of the many simplifications made, and perhaps more could have been soundly incorporated, the general system behavior is quite in accord with what would be expected of the real world. This model is, however, only an initial probing of the problem and much more remains to be done. Some of this is indicated herein. One area of tremendous importance has been recognized, that is, the new vessel ordering decisions. It is this aspect of the system that essentially stimulates cyclical behavior patterns. It is felt that the model presented here can serve as a foundation structure upon which to develop more fully this area of investigation, and as a guide in such development.




VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

The first area requiring further work is the independent owners new vessel ordering rate. The difficulties encountered, as described in Chapter IV, can be remedied without too much difficulty. Further analysis of subsequent computer runs should eventually lead to decision rules that are reasonable.

Computer runs can then be made to investigate the effects of various changes in the model, either in parameters or policy statements, upon the system response. This would not only give insight into more of the forces behind the cyclical behavior, but also permit continual refinement of the model.


The tankship industry poses a problem, in its cyclical behavior, that seems to be, at first glance, quite amenable to analysis by the methods of industrial dynamics. This work has shown clearly that industrial dynamics can be used effectively to investigate such a problem, which is intimately related to dynamic changes in the tankship industry. It is hoped that further work can build upon this in gaining a sounder understanding of the ups and downs in the tankship market.



BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

References

- (1) Koopmans, Tjalling, "Tanker Freight Rates and Tankship Building," P. S. King & Son, Ltd., London, 1939.
- (2) Forrester, Jay W., "Definitions of Industrial Dynamics," Memorandum D-59 (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, December 2, 1959.
- (3) Forrester, Jay W., "Industrial Dynamics - A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers," Harvard Business Review, Vol. 36, July-August, 1958.
- (4) Forrester, Jay W., "Models of Dynamic Behavior of Industrial and Economic Systems - A Section of Industrial Dynamics Class Notes," Memorandum D-46, (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, August 1, 1959.
- (5) Fox, P., A. Pugh, G. Duren, E. Roberts, D. Howard, "DYNAMO II, an IBM 704 Program for Generating Dynamic Models," Memorandum D-47, (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, July 24, 1959.
- (6) Duren, G., P. Fox, A. Pugh, "Addendum 1 (DYNAMO IIa) to Industrial Dynamics Memo D-47," Memorandum D-60, (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, December 1, 1959.
- (7) Howard, D. J., "Procedure for Constructing and Submitting a Model to be Run by DYNAMO," Memorandum D-53, (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, January 11, 1960.
- (8) Bes, J., "Tanker Chartering and Management," C. de Boer, Jr., Amsterdam, 1956.
- (9) Kahle, Loren F., "Tanker Surplus Will Get Bigger," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 56, December 29, 1958.
- (10) Kahle, Loren F., and A. J. Kelley, Jr., "The Role of Sea Transportation in the Petroleum Industry," Fifth World Petroleum Congress, 1959.
- (11) Kahle, Loren F., "Surplus in Growing, But New Deliveries Continue," Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 57, December 28, 1959.

- (12) Winterbottom, John J., " Tanker Surplus Continues to Increase " , Oil and Gas Journal, Vol. 53, December 27, 1954.
 - (13) Zannetos, Zenon S., "The Theory of Oil Tankship Rates," Ph. D. Thesis, Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 1959.
 - (14) Wylie, C. R., Jr., "Advanced Engineering Mathematics," McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1951.
 - (15) Howard, David J., "Description of the Model of Production, Scheduling and Customer Delay as Used in 1959 Summer Session," Memorandum D-51, (an unpublished paper), Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, August 24, 1959.
- 

A P P E N D I X



APPENDIX BDIFFERENTIAL EQUATION PREDICTION TECHNIQUE

The problem posed is to accurately predict the future levels in third order exponential delays based on certain assumptions as to the future input rates. The output rates are, of course, determined by the character of the exponential delays themselves. The method employed is straight-forward in nature. The differential equations of the levels are set up and solved as functions of time.

The case in point involves the level of negotiated but unstarted time charters and the level of vessels on time charters. The rate of vessels going into charter operation, from the first level, is a third order exponentially delayed value of the rate of signing charters, that is, the input rate to the level. The rate at which vessels leave the second level, of vessels in operation, is a third order exponentially delayed value of the rate at which they enter operation. Thus, we essentially have a sixth order delay between the signing of charters and their completion. However, the delay is different in the first three cascades from the second third order delay. The question then is: what will be the total of vessels in operation, that is, in the last three stages, after an arbitrary length of time if the signing of charters is stopped completely (input rate goes to zero)? Based on the answer to this question, and other factors involved, a decision will be made as to how many vessels to actually charter.

From the level equations of each of the six cascaded first order delays, we can derive the differential equations for the rate of change of the level. Calling the six levels, L_1 , L_2 , L_3 , L_4 , L_5 , and L_6 , and the outflow rates from these, R_1 , R_2 , R_3 , R_4 , R_5 , and R_6 , respectively,

we can write these twelve equations:

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 L_1' = 0.0 - R_1 & R_1 = L_1/T_1 \\
 L_2' = R_1 - R_2 & R_2 = L_2/T_1 \\
 L_3' = R_2 - R_3 & R_3 = L_3/T_1 \\
 L_4' = R_3 - R_4 & R_4 = L_4/T_2 \\
 L_5' = R_4 - R_5 & R_5 = L_5/T_2 \\
 L_6' = R_5 - R_6 & R_6 = L_6/T_2
 \end{array}$$

where the primes ('s) indicate the first derivative with respect to time, and T_1 and T_2 are the delay constants. By substituting the values of the rates in terms of levels and time constants into the equations on the left we remain with six equations and six unknowns. The first equation has only one unknown, L_1 , since the input rate is assumed (given here as 0.0, but it may be any function of time). Therefore, this equation can be solved independently. Since the second equation involves only L_2 and L_1 , as soon as the first equation is solved for L_1 , as a function of time, this value of L_1 can be substituted in the second equation. Then this second equation can be solved for L_2 . This process is continued until L_6 is solved for as a function of time. The solution will involve powers of e to functions of time and the delay constants, and coefficients based on the initial conditions, which in this case are the present values of the respective levels.

The actual equations derived and used are in Appendix C in the coordination department. As a check upon these equations, and the method used (which assumes an infinitesimal solution time interval), a computer run was made which only included the necessary rates and levels, and the prediction equations (see Dynamo Run No. 1029, Industrial Dynamics Files, School of Industrial Management, M.I.T.). This run verified both the method and the equations to complete satisfaction. The predictions

were within about 0.5% of the actually generated values. This discrepancy is probably caused by the finite solution time interval used.

The author wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance rendered by Mr. Donald Aucamp, of the Industrial Dynamics Group, School of Industrial Management, M.I.T., in deriving the above method and getting the solution started.

6N TO1=CRT AR0402
20N TN2=CTN/3.0 AR0403
6N TO2=TO1 AR0404
20N TN3=CTN/3.0 AR0405
6N DCT=TO2 AR0406
6N FVS=1.00 AR0473
NOTE AR0000
NOTE AR0000
NOTE AR0000
NOTE COORDINATION DEPARTMENT, OIL COMPANY MARINE DIVISIONS AR0000

NOTE SYSTEM EQUATIONS AR0000
18A YUO.K=(JIO.K+JFJF0.JK+DTYR) AR0240
20N DTYR=DT/12.0 AR0284
13A YSO.K=(RSO.K)(DT)(LASO.K) AR0241
21A AFO.K=(1/OTO.K)(YUO.K-YSO.K) AR0242
14A XAO.K=MULO+(3.0)(AFO.K) AR0245
46A MSO.K=(OTO.K)(XAO.K)(XAO.K)/(AFO.K)(108.0) AR0246
29A XPO.K=(FRV.K)LOGN(NRSO) AR0243
28R RSO.KL=(MSO.K)EXP(XPO.K) AR0244
12A ASO.K=(AFO.K)(ASCR) AR0462
6R LASO.KL=ASO.K AR0445
6R JIO.KL=OIO.K AR0238
6R JFO.KL=AFO.K AR0239
20N EXP1=(ILIC/TAU1) AR0163
20N EXP2=(ILIC/TAU2) AR0164
28N EP1=(1.0)EXP(EXP1) AR0165
12N EP2=(ILIC)(EP1) AR0166
12N EP3=(ILIC)(EP2) AR0167
28N EP21=(1.0)EXP(EXP2) AR0168
12N EP22=(ILIC)(EP21) AR0169
12N EP23=(ILIC)(EP22) AR0170
7N DBIT=TAU1-TAU2 AR0171
44N CRIT=(TAU1)(TAU2)/DBIT AR0172
20N TAU1=IBIO/3.0 AR0173

20N	TAU2=TCIC/3.0	AR0174
6A	C11.K=IN1.K	AR0178
6A	C12.K=IN2.K	AR0179
20A	C22.K=C11.K/TAU1	AR0180
6A	C13.K=IN3.K	AR0181
20A	C23.K=C12.K/TAU1	AR0182
42A	C33.K=C22.K/((2.0)/(TAU1))	AR0183
44A	C44.K=(CR11)(C33.K)/TAU1	AR0184
18A	C34.K=(CR11)(R23.K-M44.K)	AR0185
20A	R23.K=C23.K/TAU1	AR0186
12A	M44.K=(2.0)/(C44.K)	AR0187
18A	C24.K=(CR11)(R13.K-C34.K)	AR0188
20A	R13.K=C13.K/TAU1	AR0189
7A	C14.K=O11.K-C24.K	AR0190
44A	C55.K=(CR11)(C44.K)/TAU2	AR0192
18A	C45.K=(CR11)(R34.K-M55.K)	AR0193
20A	R34.K=C34.K/TAU2	AR0194
12A	M55.K=(2.0)/(C55.K)	AR0195
18A	C35.K=(CR11)(R24.K-C45.K)	AR0196
20A	R24.K=C24.K/TAU2	AR0197
20A	C25.K=C14.K/TAU2	AR0198
7A	C15.K=O12.K-C35.K	AR0199
44A	C66.K=(CR11)(C55.K)/TAU2	AR0202
18A	C56.K=(CR11)(R45.K-M66.K)	AR0203
20A	R45.K=C45.K/TAU2	AR0204
12A	M66.K=(C66.K)/(2.0)	AR0205
18A	C46.K=(CR11)(R35.K-C56.K)	AR0206
20A	R35.K=C35.K/TAU2	AR0207
42A	C36.K=C25.K/((2.0)/(TAU2))	AR0208
20A	C26.K=C15.K/TAU2	AR0209
7A	C16.K=O13.K-C46.K	AR0210
12A	FL1.K=(C11.K)(EP11)	AR0211
15A	FL2.K=(C12.K)(EP11)+(C22.K)(EP12)	AR0212
16A	FL3.K=(C13.K)(EP11)+(C23.K)(EP12)+(C33.K)(EP13)+(0.0)/(1.0)	AR0213

NOTE		AR0000
NOTE		AR0000
NOTE	SHIPYARD SECTOR	AR0000
NOTE		
NOTE	SYSTEM EQUATIONS	AR0000
1L	U0S.K=U0S.J+(DT)*(T00.JK-TCO.JK)	AR0009
1L	U1S.K=U1S.J+(DT)*(T01.JK-TCI.JK)	AR0010
4L	S0S.K=S0S.J+(DT)*(1/TSOS)*(T00.JK+T01.JK-S0S.J+0.0+0.0+0.0)	AR0011
12A	UNS.K=(S0S.K)/(SNBS)	AR0012
20A	EBS.K=S0S.K/OUTP	AR0013
42A	EUS.K=DUS.K/(OUTP)*(T0US)	AR0014
7A	EDS.K=EBS.K+EUS.K	AR0015
8A	DUS.K=UIS.K+U0S.K-UNS.K	AR0016
1L	EAS.K=EAS.J+(DT)*(HRS.JK-FRS.JK)	AR0017
7A	ECS.K=EDS.K-EAS.K	AR0018
12A	SCG.K=(EAS.K)/(OUTP)	AR0019
51R	HRS.KL=CLIP(PHS.K,0.0,EC.S.K,0.0)	AR0020
51R	FRS.KL=CLIP(PFS.K,0.0,-EC.S.K,0.0)	AR0021
20A	PHS.K=EC.S.K/IES	AR0022
20A	PFS.K=-EC.S.K/IDES	AR0023
17A	CP.S.K=(CPMS)*(1.0)+(URS.K)*(URS.K)-(CPRS)+(0.0)*(1.0)*(1.0)	AR0071
21A	URS.K=(1/UNS.K)*(U0S.K+UIS.K)	AR0025
7N	CPRS=CPNS-CPMS	AR0026
26A	U0I.K=(U0S.K+0.0+0.0)/(UIS.K+U0S.K+0.0)	AR0027
21A	CSL.K=(1/DI)*(U0S.K+UIS.K)	AR0028
51A	TCI.K=CLIP(CSL.K,SCC.K,SCC.K,CSL.K)	AR0029
12R	TCO.KL=(U0I.K)/(ICT.K)	AR0030
18R	TCI.KL=(TCI.K)/(1.0-U0I.K)	AR0031
1L	TU0.K=IU0.J+(DI)*(TCO.JK-ID0.JK)	AR0032
1L	TUI.K=TUI.J+(DI)*(TCI.JK-TDI.JK)	AR0033
39R	TDO.KL=DELAY3(TCO.JK,TCAS)	AR0034
39R	TDI.KL=DELAY3(TCI.JK,TCAS)	AR0035
7A	TBO.K=U0S.K+IU0.K	AR0282
7A	TBI.K=UIS.K+TUI.K	AR0283

26A EDI=K*(IBO+K+TBI+K+0.0)/(IDO+JK+IDI+JK+0.0) AR0309

NOTE

NOTE SYSTEM PARAMETERS

C ISQS=72.0/SNDS=15.0/OUIP=0.0001/IOUS=60.0 AR0335

C TIES=4.0/IDES=4.0 AR0085

C CPMS=0.80/CPNS=1.00/TCAS=18.0 AR0336

NOTE

NOTE INITIAL CONDITIONS

12N UOS={SNBS}(TOO) AR0038

12N UIS={SNBS}(TOI) AR0039

7N SOS=TOO+TOI AR0040

21N EAS=(1/OUTP)(TOO+TOI) AR0041

12N TUO={TCAS}(TOO) AR0042

12N TUI={TCAS}(TOI) AR0043

6N TCO=TOO AR0046

6N TCI=TOI AR0047

NOTE

APPENDIX DGLOSSARY OF VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS

- AA - coefficient to suit specified conditions
 AFI - average Age of Fleet, Independents, years
 AFO - " " " " , Oil companies, "
 AFP - " " " " , oil " , Projected, yrs.
 ALH - Average Length of Haul, miles.
 ASCR - Age of SCRappage as multiple of age of fleet
 ASI - average Age of Scrappage, Independents, years
 ASO - " " " " , Oil companies "
 BB - coefficient to suit specified conditions
 CONV - CONVersion factor, T-2/bbl-miles/day
 CRD - Chartering Rate, voyage, to meet Demand, T-2/mon.
 CRT - " " , Time, actual, T-2/mon.
 CRV - " " , Voyage, actual, T-2/mon.
 CSL - Construction Start Limiting rate, T-2/mon.
 CTD - Chartering rate, Time, Desired, T-2/mon.
 CTI - CorreCtion facter to CTD for Intermediate run
 CTN - Chartered tankers, Time, Not yet in operation, T-2s
 CVN - " " , Voyage, " " " " , "
 DCT - Desired rate of Time charters going into operation,
 T-2/mon.
 DD - coefficient to suit specified conditions
 DDO - Delayed value of RDO
 DOI - Desired Order rate, Independents, T-2/mon.
 DOO - " " " " , Oil companies, "
 DPO - Deliveries, Projected, to Oil companies, T-2s
 DRT - Desired Rate of Tansfer, oil cos., T-2/mon.
 DRV - Desired Rate of Voyage charters going into
 operation, T-2/mon.
 DSM - Desired Share of Market, independents
 DTYR - solution time interval, years
 DUS - Difference between actual and normal Unstarted
 backlog at Shipyards, T-2s
 EAS - Employment Actual, at Shipyards, men
 EBS - " " desired for normal Business level, at
 Shipyards, men
 ECS - Employment Change desiredm at Shipyards, men
 EDS - " " Desired, total, at " , "
 EDT - Estimated Delivery Time, from shipyards, mon.
 EST - " " Supply of Tankers, oil companies, T-2s
 EUS - Employment desired to correct size of Unstarted
 backlog at Shipyards, men
 FLT - Future amount of vessels Leaving Time charters, T-2s
 FOT - " " number of vessels On Time charters, T-2s
 FRA - intermediate change in FRV
 FRB - " " expected value of FRV
 FRC - Freight Rate index rate of Change
 FRD - long term change in FRV
 FRC - trial value of FRI
 FRI - Freight Rate index, predicted, Intermediate run
 FRP - Freight " " , Predicted, long run
 FRS - Firing Rate at Shipyard, men/mon.

FRV - Freight Rate index, Voyage
FRVL - minimum value of FRV
FRVM - Maximum " " "
FRVT - Tabular values of FRV
FRX - average long run value of FRV
FRY - second trial value of FRV
FVS - Freight rate index, Voyage, Smoothed
HRS - Hiring Rate at Shipyard, men/month
IIT - Intermediate Increase in Time charters, T-2s
IOT - " decrease " " " "
IPC - " Percentage of demand covered by either
owned or time chartered vessels
IPD - Intermediate Projected Demand for oil, bbl/day
IPI - " " Increase in owned vessels, T-2s
IPO - " " Ownership, T-2s
IPS - " " Scrappage, T-2s
IPT - " " demand for Tankers, T-2s
IPT - " desired Ratio of coverage to Total demand
ITC - " projected Time Charters, T-2s
ITI - Idle Tankers, Independents, T-2s
ITO - " " , Oil companies, T-2s
JFI - artificial rate (AFIO)
JFO - " " (AFO)
JTI - " " (OTI)
JTO - " " (OTO)
LASI - " " (ASI)
LASO - " " (ASO)
LDC - Long term Desired Ownership, oil cos., T-2s
LDT - " " " Time charters, oil cos., T-2s
LLR - Lower Limit of Rate ROT, T-2/mon.
LPD - Long term Projected Demand for oil, bbl/day
LPO - " " " tanker Ownership, T-2s
LPS - " " " Scrappage, T-2s
LPT - " " " demand for Tankers, T-2s
MALH - Minimum Average Length of Haul, miles
MCT - Maximum value of RTO, T-2/mon.
MIS - " desired Increase in Share of market
MNDO - Minimum value of NDO, mon.
MOI - Minimum Order rate, Independents, T-2/mon.
MOC - " " " , Oil cos., T-2/mon.
MPRT - Maximum Percentage of idle vessels going into Timesch.
MPRV - " " " " " " " " Voy.ch.
MRT - Maximum Rate of Transfer, T-2/mon.
MRV - " value of RTO, T-2/mon.
MSI - " rate of Scrappage, Independents, T-2/mon.
MSC - " " " " " , Oil cos., T-2/mon.
MSP - " " " " " , Predicted, " / " .
MULI - Minimum age Limit on scrappage, Independents, yrs.
MULO - " " " " " , Oil companies, yrs.
MALH - Normal Average Length of Haul, miles
NCDS - " total Construction Delay at Shipyards, mon.
NDI - Negotiation time available for ordering, Indep., mon.
NDO - " " used by Oil companies, mon.
NIFI - Normal Idle Fleet factor, Independents
NMDA - Number of Months Demand is Anticipated, mon.

NRSI - Normal Rate of Scrappage, Indep. (as % of max.)
NRSO - " " " " , Oil cos., (as % of max.)
NTCO - Negotiation time available to Time Charter, Oil cos.,
mon.
NXI - Negotiation time actual, Independents, mon.
NXO - " " available to Oil companies, mon.
OPO - Owned tankers, Projected, of Oil companies, T-2s
OTI - " " of Independents, T-2s
OTC - " " Oil companies, T-2s
OUTP - productivity OUTPUT, T-2/man-month
PCD - Projected rate of Change in TDO, T-2/mon./mon.
PCI - " " " " RTI, " / " / "
PCO - " " " " RTO, " / " / "
PCS - " " " " RSO, " / " / "
PDI - Predicted Demand for oil, Independents, bbl/day
PDO - Present Demand for Oil, bbl/day
PDT - " " Tankers, T-2s
PFI - Predicted Fleet requirements, Indep., T-2s
PFS - Possible Firing rate, at Shipyards, men/month.
PHDO - Past History of Demand for Oil (boxcar train)
PHDO*1 - first boxcar in PHDO, bbl/day
PHS - Possible Hiring rate, at Shipyards, men/month.
PID - Projected average Increase in TDO, T-2/mon.
PII - " " " " RTI, " / "
PIO - " " " " RTO, " / "
PIS - " " " " RSO, " / "
PLDI - Part of oil co. market that is Desired by Indep., at
maximum FRP
PNI - Predicted New vessels, Independents, T-2s
POI - " Ownership, Independents, T-2s(revision)
POI - Percentage of total vessels Owned by Indep.(original)
POR - Predicted additional Ownership Requirements, T-2s
PPD1 - " Present Demand, least square method, bbl/day
PPD2 - " " " , smoothing method, bbl/day
PRI - " ownership Requirements, Indep., T-2s
PRO - Percentage of Requirements to be met by Owned vessels
PROT - Tabular value of PRO
PRT - Percentage of Requirements to be met by Time charters
plus owned ships
PRTT - Tabular values of PRT
PSD1 - Predicted Slope of Demand, least square method, b/d/mo.
PSD2 - " " " " , smoothing method, bbl/day/m.
PSI - Predicted Scrappage, Independents, T-2s
PSM - Present Share of Market, independents
PTE - Percentage of Tankers Employed
PTR - Predicted additional Time charters Required, T-2s
RDO - artificial rate for extrapolating PDO
RDH - Rate of Demand History accumulation, bbl/day/month.
RHDO - Recent History of Demand for Oil (boxcar train)
RHDO*1 - first boxcar in RHDO, bbl/day
RHDO*2 - second " " " " / "
RIS - Smoothed value of RTI, T-2/mon.
ROS - " " " RTO, " / "
ROT - Rate of Oil company vessel Transfer, T-2/mon.
RPD - Ratio of actual to Predicted Demand

RSI - Rate of Scrappage, Independents, T-2/mon.
 RSM - Ratio of desired to present Share of Market
 RSO - Rate of Scrappage, Oil companies, T-2/mon.
 RSP - " " " , Predicted, T-2/mon.
 RSPI - " " " , " , Indep., T-2/mon.
 RSS - Smoothed value of RSO, T-2/mon.
 RTI - Rate of Time charters going Idle, T-2/mon.
 RTO - " " " " " into Operation, T-2/mon.
 RVI - " " Voyage charters going Idle, T-2/mon.
 RVO - " " " " " into Operation, T-2/mon.
 SCC - Shipyard Construction Capability, T-2/mon.
 SDO - Smoothed Demand for Oil, bbl/day
 SNBS - Size of Normal Backlog at Shipyard, mon.
 SCS - Smoothed Order rate at Shipyards, T-2/mon.
 SPO - Scrappage, Projected, of Oil companies, T-2s
 STIN - Shifting Time Interval, mon.
 STO - Share of market that is desired to be Taken Over, at maximum FRP
 STR - Second Trial Rate (ROT), T-2/mon.
 TAP - Tankers Additionally required to meet Projected demand
 TBI - Tanker Backlog at shipyards, Independents, T-2s
 TBO - " " " " , Oil companies, T-2s
 TBTO - Time Before Time charters go into Operation, mon.
 TBVO - " " Voyage " " " " " "
 TBX - part of TBI that is expected to be delivered if EDT is greater than NCDS
 TCI - Tanker Construction start rate, Indep., T-2/mon.
 TCO - " " " " , Oil cos., T-2/mon.
 TCT - Total Construction start rate, T-2/mon.
 TCTC - Time, average, on Charter for Time Charters, mon.
 TCVC - " " " " " Voyage " "
 TDES - " over which it is desired to Decrease Employment at Shipyards, mon.
 TDDO - Time constant in Delay for DDO, mon.
 TDI - Tanker Delivery rate to Independents, T-2/mon.
 TDO - " " " " Oil companies, " / "
 TDS - Smoothed value of TDO, T-2/mon.
 TFST - Time period for Fitting a Straight line to the data, mon.
 TIES - Time over which it is desired to Increase Employment at Shipyards, mon.
 TIN - Tankers to be ordered by Independents, with Normal freight rate, T-2/mon.
 TIRC - Time period for InterMediate Considerations, mon.
 TLTC - " " " Long Term Considerations, mon.
 TITI - " " " " " " , Indep., mon.
 TNOO - " Needed to put vessel into Operation, Oil co., mo.
 TNVC - " , average, available to Negotiate for Voy. Gh., mo.
 TOO - Tankers in Operation, oil Companies, T-2s
 TOI - Tanker Ordering rate, Independents, T-2/mon.
 TOC - " " " , Oil companies, " / "
 TOP - Tankers required to be Obtained to meet Projected demand, T-2s
 TOT - Tankers On Time charter, T-2s
 TOUS - Time period Over which it is desired to correct Unstarted backlog at Shipyards, mon.

TOV - Tankers On Voyage charter, T-2s
 TPI - " Projected to go Idle off time charter, T-2s
 TPO - " " " " On time charter, T-2s
 TPT - " " on Time charter, T-2s
 TRO - Trial Rate of Transfer (ROT), T-2/mon.
 TSDO - Time period for Smoothing the Demand for Oil, mon.
 TSFR - " " " " FRV, mon.
 TSOS - " " " " Order rates at Shipyds.,mo.
 TSRI - " " " " RTI, mon.
 TSRO - " " " " RTO, "
 TSRS - " " " " RSO, "
 TSTD - " " " " TDO, "
 TTI - predicted rate of Tonnage Increase, T-2/mon.
 TUDV - Time period in which it is desired to deplete UDV,mo.
 TUI - Tankers Under construction for Independents, T-2s
 TUO - " " " " Oil companies, "
 UDV - Unfilled Demand for Voyage charters, T-2s
 UIS - Unstarted orders, Independents, at Shipyards, T-2s
 ULR - Upper Limit of Rate ROT, T-2/mon.
 UNS - Unstarted order backlog, Normal, at Shipyards, T-2s
 UOI - fraction of total Unstarted backlog ordered by Oil cos.
 UCS - Unstarted orders, Oil companies, at Shipyards, T-2s
 URV - Unfilled chartering Rate, Voyage, T-2/mon.
 XAI - eXcess Age in fleet, Indep.,yrs.
 XAO - " " " " , Oil cos.,yrs.
 XAP - " " " " , Predicted, yrs.
 XPI - eXponential Power for scrappage rate, Independents
 XPO - " " " " " " , Oil cos,
 XPP - " " " " " " , Predicted
 XPPI - " " " " " " , Indep.
 XRV - difference between desired and maximum rates, T-2/mon.
 YSI - T-2 Years of Scrapped vessels, Indep., T-2-yrs.
 YSO - " " " " " " , Oil cos., " - "
 YUI - " " " Unscrapped " " , Indep., " - "
 YUC - " " " " " " , Oil cos., " - "